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3.1  Introduction 
What policy rules should central banks follow? A growing number of econo- 
mists and policymakers advocate targets for the level of inflation. Many also 
argue that inflation targeting should be implemented through a “Taylor rule” 
in which interest rates are adjusted in response to output and inflation. These 
views are supported by  the theoretical models of  Svensson (1997) and Ball 
(1997), in which the optimal policies are versions of inflation targets and Tay- 
lor rules. 
Many analyses of policy rules assume a closed economy. This paper extends 
the Svensson-Ball model to an open economy and asks how the optimal poli- 
cies change. The short answer is they change quite a bit. In open economies, 
inflation targets and Taylor rules are suboptimal unless they are modified in 
important ways. Different rules are required because monetary policy affects 
the economy through exchange rate as well as interest rate channels.’ 
Section 3.2 presents the model, which consists of three equations. The first 
is a dynamic, open economy IS equation: output depends on lags of itself, the 
real interest rate, and the real exchange rate. The second is an open economy 
Phillips curve: the change in inflation depends on lagged output and the lagged 
change in the exchange rate, which affects inflation through import prices. The 
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final equation is a relation between interest rates and exchange rates that cap- 
tures the behavior of asset markets. 
Section 3.3 derives the optimal instrument rule in the model. This rule dif- 
fers in two ways from the Taylor rule that is optimal in a closed economy. First, 
the policy instrument is a weighted sum of the interest rate and the exchange 
rate-a  “monetary conditions index” like the ones used in several countries. 
Second, on the right-hand side of the policy rule, inflation is replaced by “long- 
run” inflation. This variable is a measure of inflation adjusted for the temporary 
effects of exchange rate fluctuations. 
Section 3.4 considers several instrument rules proposed in other papers at 
this conference. I find that most of these rules perform poorly in my model. 
Section 3.5 turns to inflation targeting. In the closed economy models of 
Svensson and Ball, a simple version of this policy is equivalent to the optimal 
Taylor rule. In an open economy, however, inflation targeting can be danger- 
ous. The reason concerns the effects of  exchange rates on inflation through 
import prices. This is the fastest channel from monetary policy to inflation, 
and so inflation targeting implies that it is used aggressively. Large shifts in the 
exchange rate produce large fluctuations in output. 
Section 3.6 presents a more positive result. While pure inflation targeting 
has undesirable effects, a modification produces much better outcomes. The 
modification is to target “long-run’’ inflation-the  inflation variable that ap- 
pears in the optimal instrument rule. This variable is not influenced by  the 
exchange-rate-to-import-price  channel, and so targeting it does not  induce 
large exchange rate movements. Targeting long-run inflation is not exactly 
equivalent to the optimal instrument rule, but it is a close approximation for 
plausible parameter values. 
Section 3.7 concludes the paper. 
3.2  The Model 
3.2.1  Assumptions 
The model is an extension of  Svensson (1997) and Ball (1997) to an open 
economy. The goal is to capture conventional wisdom about the major effects 
of monetary policy in a simple way. The model is similar in spirit to the more 
complicated macroeconometric models of many central banks. 
The model consists of three equations: 
(2)  IT  =  IT,  +  ay-, - y(e-, - e-*) +  q, 
(3) 
where y is the log of real output, r is the real interest rate, e is the log of  the 
real exchange rate (a higher e means appreciation), IT  is inflation, and E, q,  and 
e  =  Or  +  v, 129  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
u  are white noise shocks. All parameters are positive, and all variables are 
measured as deviations from average levels. 
Equation (1) is an open economy IS curve. Output depends on lags of the 
real interest rate and the real exchange rate, its own lag, and a demand shock. 
Equation (2)  is an open economy Phillips curve. The change in inflation 
depends on the lag of  output, the lagged change in the exchange rate, and a 
shock. The change in the exchange rate affects inflation because it is passed 
directly into import prices. This interpretation is formalized in the appendix, 
which derives equation (2)  from separate equations for domestic goods and 
import inflation. 
Finally, equation (3) posits a link between the interest rate and the exchange 
rate. It captures the idea that a rise in the interest rate makes domestic assets 
more attractive, leading to an appreciation. The shock v captures other influ- 
ences on the exchange rate, such as expectations, investor confidence, and for- 
eign interest rates. Equation (3) is similar to reduced-form equations for the 
exchange rate in many textbooks. 
The central bank chooses the real interest rate r. One can interpret any policy 
rule as a rule for setting r. Using equation (3), one can also rewrite any rule as 
a rule for setting e, or for setting some combination of e and r.* 
A key feature of the model is that policy affects inflation through two chan- 
nels. A monetary contraction reduces output and thus inflation through the 
Phillips curve, and it also causes an appreciation that reduces inflation directly. 
The lags in equations (l), (2),  and (3) imply that the first channel takes two 
periods to work: a tightening raises r and e contemporaneously, but it takes a 
period for these variables to affect output and another period for output to affect 
inflation. In contrast, the direct effect of an exchange rate change on inflation 
takes only one period. These assumptions capture the common view that the 
direct exchange rate effect is the quickest channel from policy to inflation. 
3.2.2  Calibration 
In analyzing the model, I will interpret a period as a year. With this interpre- 
tation, the time lags in the model are roughly realistic. Empirical evidence 
suggests that policy affects inflation through the direct exchange rate channel 
in about a year, and through the output channel in about two years (e.g., Re- 
serve Bank of New Zealand 1996; Lafleche 1996). 
The analysis will use a set of base parameter values. Several of these values 
are borrowed from the closed economy model in Ball (1997). Based on evi- 
dence discussed there, I assume that  A,  the output persistence coefficient, is 
0.8; that a,  the slope of the Phillips curve, is 0.4; and that the total output loss 
from a 1-point rise in the interest rate is 1.0. In the current model, this total 
2. Note I assume that policymakers set the real interest rate. In practice, the interest rates con- 
trolled directly by policymakers are nominal rates. However, policymakers can move the real inter- 
est rate to their desired level by setting the nominal rate equal to the desired red  rate plus inflation. 130  Laurence Ball 
effect is p + 60: p is the direct effect of the interest rate and SO  is the effect 
through the exchange rate. I therefore assume p + 60 = 1  .O. 
The other parameters depend on the economy’s degree of openness. My base 
values are meant to apply to medium to small open economies such as Canada, 
Australia, and New Zealand. My main sources for the parameters are studies 
by these countries’ central banks. I assume y = 0.2 (a 1 percent appreciation 
reduces inflation by  two-tenths of  a point) and 0 = 2.0 (a 1 point rise in the 
interest rate causes a 2 percent appreciation). I also assume PIS = 3.0, captur- 
ing a common rule of thumb about IS coefficients. Along with my  other as- 
sumptions, this implies p = 0.6 and 6 = 0.Z3 
3.3  Efficient  Instrument Rules 
Following Taylor (1994), the optimal policy rule is defined as the one that 
minimizes a  weighted  sum of  output variance  and  inflation  variance. The 
weights are determined by  policymakers’ tastes. As in Ball (1997), an “effi- 
cient” rule is one that is optimal for some weights, or equivalently a rule that 
puts the economy on the output-inflation variance frontier. This section derives 
the set of efficient rules in the model. 
3.3.1  Variables in the Rule 
As discussed earlier, we can interpret any policy rule as a rule for I-, a rule 
for e, or a rule for a combination of the two. Initially, it is convenient to con- 
sider rules for e. To derive the efficient rules, I first substitute equation (3) into 
equation (1) to eliminate I  from the model. I shift the time subscripts forward 
to show the effects of the current exchange rate on future output and inflation. 
This yields 
(4)  y+l  =  -(PI0  +  8)e +  Ay +  + (p/0)v, 
(5)  n+, =  +  ay - r(e - cI)  +  q+,. 
Consider a policymaker choosing the current e. One can define the state 
variables of the model by two expressions corresponding to terms on the right- 
hand sides of equations (4) and (5):  Ay  + (pI0)v and  IT  + ay + ye-,.  The 
future paths of output and inflation are determined by these two expressions, 
the rule for choosing e,  and future shocks. Since the model is linear-quadratic, 
one can show the optimal rule is linear in the two state variables: 
(6)  e  =  m[Ay + (p/0)v]  +  n(n  +  ay  +  ye-,), 
where m and n are constants to be determined. 
In equation (6), the choice of  e depends on the exchange rate shock v as 
3. Examples of  my  sources for base parameter values are the Canadian studies of  Longworth 
and Poloz (1986) and Duguay (1994) and the Australian study of Gruen and Shuetrim (1994). 131  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
well as observable variables. By  equation (3),  v can be replaced by  e -  Or. 
Making this substitution and rearranging terms yields 
(7)  wr + (1 - w)e  =  uy  +  b(rr +  ye-,), 
where 
w  =  mpO/(O - mp +  mpO),  u  =  O(mX  +  m)/(O - mp +  mpe), 
b  =  nW(O - mp +  430). 
This expresses the optimal policy as a rule for an average of r and e. 
3.3.2  Interpretation 
In the closed economy model of Svensson and Ball, the optimal policy is a 
Taylor rule: the interest rate depends on output and inflation. Equation (7) mod- 
ifies the Taylor rule in two ways. First, the policy variable is a combination of 
r and e. And second, inflation is replaced by  rr + ye-,, a combination of infla- 
tion and the lagged exchange rate. Each of these modifications has a simple in- 
terpretation. 
The first result supports the practice of using an average of r and e-a  “mon- 
etary conditions index” (MC1)-as  the policy instrument. Several countries 
follow this approach, including Canada, New Zealand, and Sweden (see Ger- 
lach and Smets 1996). The rationale for using an MCI is that it measures the 
overall stance of policy, including the stimulus through both r and e.  Policy- 
makers shift the MCI when they want to ease or tighten. When there are shifts 
in the e/r  relation-shocks  to equation (3)-r  is adjusted to keep the MCI at 
the desired level. 
The second modification of  the Taylor rule is more novel. The term IT  + 
ye- , can be interpreted as a long-run forecast of inflation under the assumption 
that output is kept at its natural level. With a closed economy Phillips curve, 
this forecast would simply be current inflation. In an open economy, however, 
inflation will change because the exchange rate will eventually return to its 
long-run level, which is normalized to zero. For example, if e was positive in 
the previous period, there will be a depreciation of e-, at some point starting 
in the current period. By equation (2), this will raise inflation by ye-, at some 
point after the current period. I will use the term “long-run inflation” and the 
symbol IT*  to stand for rr + ye-,. 
More broadly, one can interpret rr  + ye-,  as a measure of  inflation that 
filters out direct but temporary effects of the exchange rate. For a given output 
path, an appreciation causes inflation to fall, but it will rise again by ye-, when 
the appreciation is reversed. The adjustment from rr to rr*  is similar in spirit 
to calculations of “core” or “underlying” inflation by central banks. These vari- 
ables  are  measures of  inflation  adjusted for  transitory influences such  as 
changes in indirect taxes or commodity prices. Many economists argue that 
policy should respond to underlying inflation and ignore transitory fluctua- 132  Laurence Ball 
tions. My model supports this idea for the case of  fluctuations caused by  ex- 
change rates. 
3.3.3 
The coefficients in the policy rule (7) depend on the constants rn and n, 
which are not yet determined.  The next step is to derive the efficient combina- 
tions of  rn and n-the  combinations that put  the economy on the output- 
inflation variance frontier. As discussed in the appendix, the set of  efficient 
policies depends on the coefficients in equations (I),  (2),  and (3) but not on the 
variances of the three shocks (although these variances determine the absolute 
position of the frontier). For base parameter values, I compute the variances of 
output and inflation for given rn and n and then search for combinations that 
define the frontier. 
Figure 3.1  presents the results in a graph. The figure shows the output- 
inflation variance frontier when the variance of each shock is one. For selected 
points on the frontier, the graph shows the policy rule coefficients that put the 
economy at that point. It also shows the weights on output variance and infla- 
tion variance that make each policy optimal. 
Two  results are noteworthy. The first concerns the weights on r and  e in 
the MCI. There is currently a debate among economists about the appropriate 
weights. Some argue that the weights should be proportional to the coefficients 
on e and r in the IS equation (e.g., Freedman 1994). For my base parameters, 
this implies w = 0.75, that is, weights of  0.75 on r and 0.25 on e. Others 
suggest a larger weight on e to reflect the direct effect of the exchange rate on 
inflation (see Gerlach and Smets 1996). In my model, the optimal weight on e 
is larger than 0.25, but by a small amount. For example, if the policymaker’s 
objective function has equal weights on output and inflation variances, the MCI 
weight on e is 0.30. The weight on e is much smaller than its relative short-run 
effect on inflation. The only exceptions occur when policymakers’ objectives 
have very little weight on output ~ariance.~ 
The second result concerns the coefficients on y and IT*,  and how they com- 
pare to the optimal coefficients on y and IT  in a closed economy. Note that a 1 
point rise in the interest rate, which also raises the exchange rate, raises the 
MCI by a total of w + €I(  1 -  w).  Dividing the coefficients on y and IT* by this 
expression yields the responses of  r to movements in y and r*  (holding con- 
stant the exchange rate shock u).  These responses are the analogues of Taylor 
rule coefficients in a closed economy. For equal weights in policymakers’ ob- 
jective functions, the interest rate response to output is 1.04 and the response 
to IT*  is 0.82. Assuming the same objective function, the corresponding re- 
Efficient Coefficients for the Rule 
4. One measure of the overall effect of  e on inflation is the effect through appreciation in one 
period plus the effect through the Phillips curve in two periods. This sum is y + Soi = 0.28. The 
corresponding effect of r on inflation is poi = 0.24. The MCI would put more weight on e than on 
r if it were based on these inflation effects. 133  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
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Fig. 3.1  Output-inflation variance frontier 
Note: Objective function = var(y) +  var(.rr). 
sponses in a closed economy are 1.13 for output and 0.82 for inflation (Ball 
1997). Thus the sizes of interest rate movements are similar in the two cases. 
3.4  Other Instrument Rules 
This paper is part of a project to evaluate policy rules in alternative macro- 
economic models. As part of the project, all authors are evaluating a list of six 
rules to see whether any performs well across a variety of models. Each of the 
rules has the general form 
(8)  r  =  ay +  bn  +  cr-,, 
where a, b, and c are constants. Table 3.1 gives the values of the constants in 
the six rules. 
All of these rules are inefficient in the current model. There are two separate 134  Laurence Ball 
Table 3.1  Alternative Policy Rules 
Rule 
1  2  3  4  5  6 
a  0.8  1  0.5 
b  2  0.2  0.5 
c  1  1  0 
Base case 
Wy)  531.59  4.42  2.62 
v=(a)  5.18  6.55  3.43 
WY)  00  6.53  2.17 
Closed economy 
va(a)  co  1.59  3.91 
~~ 
1  0.06  0.08 
0.5  0.2  0.3 
0  2.86  2.86 
1.86  m  m 
4.05  m  m 
1.81  ca  00 
4.22  00  ca 
problems. First, the rules are designed for closed economies and therefore do 
not make the adjustments for exchange rate effects discussed in the last section. 
Second, even if the economy were closed, the coefficients in most of the rules 
would be inefficient. To  distinguish between these problems, I evaluate the 
rules in two versions of my model: the open economy case considered above 
and a closed economy case obtained by  setting 6 and y to zero. The latter is 
identical to the model in Ball (  1997).5 
Table 3.1 presents the variances of output and inflation for the six rules. The 
rules fall into two categories. The first are those with c,  the coefficient on 
lagged r, equal to or greater than one (rules 1,2, 5, and 6). For these rules, the 
output and inflation variances range from large to infinite, both in closed and 
open economies. This result reflects the fact that efficient rules in either case do 
not include the lagged interest rate. Including this variable leads to inefficient 
oscillations in output and inflation. 
The other rules, numbers 3  and 4, omit the lagged interest rate (c = 0). 
These rules perform well in a closed economy. Indeed, rule 4 is fully efficient 
in that case; rule 3 is not quite efficient, but it puts the economy close to the 
frontier (see Ball 1997). In an open economy, however, rules 3 and 4 are inef- 
ficient because they ignore the exchange rate. Rule 4, for example, produces 
an output variance of  1.86 and an inflation variance of 4.05. Using an efficient 
rule, policy can achieve the same output variance with an inflation variance 
of 3.54. 
Recall that the set of  efficient rules does not depend on the variances of 
the model’s three shocks. In contrast, the losses from using an inefficient rule 
generally do depend on these variances. For rules 3 and 4, the losses are moder- 
ate when demand and inflation shocks are most important, but larger when the 
exchange rate shock is most important. That is, using r as the policy instrument 
5. In the closed economy case, I continue to assume f3  + 60 = 1. Therefore, since 6 is zero, p 
is raised to one. 135  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
is most inefficient if there are large shocks to the rle relation. In this case, r is 
an unreliable measure of the overall policy stance. 
3.5  The Perils of Inflation Targeting 
This section turns from instrument rules to target rules, specifically inflation 
targets. In  the closed economy Svensson-Ball model, inflation targeting has 
good properties. In particular, the set of efficient Taylor rules is equivalent to 
the set of inflation target policies with different speeds of  adjustment. In an 
open economy, however, inflation targeting can be dangerous. 
3.5.1  Strict Inflation Targets 
As in Ball (1997), strict inflation targeting is defined as the policy that mini- 
mizes the variance of  inflation. When inflation deviates from its target, strict 
targeting eliminates the deviation as quickly as possible. I first evaluate this 
policy and then consider variations that allow slower adjustment. 
Trivially, strict inflation targeting is an efficient policy: it minimizes the 
weighted sum of output and inflation variances when the output weight is zero. 
Strict targeting puts the economy at the northwest end of the variance frontier. 
In figure 3.1, the frontier is cut off when the output variance reaches 15; when 
the frontier is extended, the end is found at an output variance of  25.8 and 
inflation variance of 1  .O.  Choosing this point implies a huge sacrifice in output 
stability for a small gain in inflation stability. Moving down the frontier, the 
output variance could be reduced to 9.7 if the inflation variance were raised to 
1.1, or to 4.1 if the inflation variance were raised to 1.6. Strict inflation tar- 
geting is highly suboptimal if  policymakers put a nonnegligible weight on 
output. 
The output variance of 25.8 compares to a variance of 8.3 under strict infla- 
tion targeting in the closed economy case. This difference arises from the dif- 
ferent channels from policy to inflation. In a closed economy, the only channel 
is the one through output, which takes two periods (it takes a period for r to 
affect y  and another period for y to affect IT). With these lags, strict inflation 
targeting implies that policy sets expected inflation in two periods to zero. In 
an open economy, by contrast, policy can affect inflation in one period through 
the direct exchange rate channel. When policymakers minimize the variance 
of inflation, they set next periods expected inflation to zero: 
(9)  EIT,,  =  0. 
Equation (9) implies large fluctuations in the exchange rate because next 
period's inflation can be controlled only by  this variable. Intuitively, inflation 
in domestic goods prices cannot be influenced in one period, so large shifts in 
import prices are needed to move the average price level. (The appendix for- 
malizes this interpretation.) The large shifts in exchange rates cause large out- 
put fluctuations through the IS curve. 136  Laurence Ball 
This point can be illustrated with impulse response functions. Substituting 
equation (5)  into equation (9) yields the instrument rule implied by strict infla- 
tion targeting: 
(10)  e  = (a/y)y + (l/y)(n +  ye-,). 
(Note this is a limiting case of eq. [7] in which the MCI equals the exchange 
rate.) Using equations (4), (3,  and (lo), I derive the dynamic effects of a unit 
shock to the Phillips curve. Figure 3.2 presents the results. Inflation returns to 
target after one period, but the shock triggers oscillations in the exchange rate 
and output. The oscillations arise because the exchange rate must be shifted 
each period to offset the inflationary or deflationary effects of previous shifts. 
These results contrast to strict inflation targeting in a closed economy, where 
an inflationary shock produces only a one-time output 10~s.~ 
3.5.2  The Case of New Zealand 
These results appear to capture real-world experiences with inflation tar- 
geting, particularly New Zealand‘s pioneering policy in the early 1990s. Dur- 
ing that period, observers criticized the Reserve Bank for moving the exchange 
rate too aggressively to control inflation. For example, Dickens (1996) argues 
that “whiplashing” of  the exchange rate produced  instability  in output. He 
shows that aggregate inflation was steady because movements in import infla- 
tion offset movements in domestic goods inflation. These outcomes are similar 
to the effects of inflation targeting in my model. 
Recently, the Reserve Bank has acknowledged problems  with strict infla- 
tion targeting: 
If  the focus of  policy is limited to a fairly short horizon of around six to 
twelve months, the setting of the policy stance will tend to be dominated by 
the relatively rapid-acting direct effects of  exchange rate and interest rate 
changes on inflation. In the early years of  inflation targeting, this was, in 
fact, more or less the way in which policy was run. . , .  Basing the stance of 
policy solely on its direct impact on inflation, however, is hazardous. . . . It 
is possible that in some situations actions aimed at maintaining price stabil- 
ity in the short term could prove destabilizing to activity and inflation in the 
medium term. (Reserve Bank of New Zealand 1996,28-29) 
The Reserve Bank‘s story is similar to mine: moving inflation to target quickly 
requires strong reliance on the direct exchange rate channel, which has adverse 
side effects on output.’ 
6. Black, Macklem, and Rose (1997) find that strict inflation targeting produces a large output 
variance in simulations of the Bank of Canada’s model. Their interpretation of this result is similar 
to mine. 
7. The Reserve Bank discusses direct inflation effects of interest rates as well as exchange rates 
because mortgage payments enter New Zealand’s consumer price index. 137  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
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Fig. 3.2  Strict idation targets: responses to an inflation shock 
3.5.3  Gradual Adjustment? 
The problems with strict inflation targeting have led observers to suggest a 
modification:  policy should move inflation to its target more slowly. The Re- 
serve Bank of New Zealand has accepted this idea; it reports that “in recent 
years the Bank‘s policy horizon has lengthened further into the future” and that 138  Laurence Ball 
this means it relies more heavily on the output channel to control inflation 
(1996,29). 
In the current model, however, it is not obvious what policy rule captures 
the goal of “lengthening the policy horizon.” One natural idea (suggested by 
several readers) is to target inflation two periods ahead rather than one period: 
(1  1)  ErT2 =  0. 
This condition is the one implied by strict inflation targeting in the closed econ- 
omy  model. In  that  model, the condition does not  produce oscillations in 
output. 
In the current model, however, equation (11) does not determine a unique 
policy rule. Since policy can control inflation period by period, there are multi- 
ple paths to zero inflation in two periods. By the law of iterated expectations, 
En,,  = 0 in all periods implies En,,  = 0 in all periods. Thus a strict inflation 
target is one policy that satisfies equation (1  1).  But there are other policies that 
return inflation to zero in two periods but not one period.8 
The same point applies to various modifications of equation (1  1). For ex- 
ample, in the closed economy model, any efficient policy can be written as an 
inflation target with slow adjustment: En,, = qEr,,, 0 sq  5 1. This condition 
is also consistent with multiple policies in the current model. There does not 
appear to be any simple restriction on inflation that implies a unique policy 
with desirable properties. Policymakers who wish to return inflation to target 
over the “medium term” need some additional criterion to define their rule.9 
3.6  Long-Run Inflation Targets 
This section presents the good news about inflation targets. The problems 
described in the previous section can be overcome by  modifying the target 
variable. In light of earlier results, a natural modification is to target long-run 
inflation, n*. 
3.6.1  The Policies 
Strict long-run inflation targeting is defined as the policy that minimizes the 
variance of r*  = r + ye-,. To see its implications, note that equation (2) can 
be rewritten as 
8. An example is a rule in which policy makes no contemporaneous response to shocks, but the 
exchange rate is adjusted after one period to return inflation to target in two periods. 
9. Another possible rule is partial adjustment in one period En,,  = qv.  This condition defines 
a unique policy, but the variance of output is large. The condition implies the same responses to 
demand and exchange rate shocks as does strict inflation targeting. These shocks have no contem- 
poraneous effects on inflation, so policy must fully eliminate their effects in the next period, even 
for q >  0. 139  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
This equation is the same as a closed economy Phillips curve, except that T* 
replaces T.  The exchange rate is eliminated, so policy affects n*  only through 
the output channel. Thus policy affects n* with a two-period lag, and strict 
targeting implies 
=  0. 
In contrast to a two-period-ahead  target for total inflation, equation (13) de- 
fines a unique policy. 
There are two related motivations for targeting ~r*  rather than n.  First, since 
T*  is not influenced by the exchange rate, policy uses only the output channel 
to control inflation. This avoids the exchange rate “whiplashing” discussed in 
the previous section. Second, as discussed in section 3.3, n*  gives the level of 
inflation  with transitory exchange rate effects removed. Targeting n* keeps 
underlying inflation on track. 
In addition to strict T*  targeting, I consider gradual adjustment of n*: 
=  qEriT,,  0  I  q  I  1. 
This rule is similar to the gradual adjustment rule that is optimal in a closed 
economy. Policy adjusts En?,  part of the way to the target from En:,,  which 
it takes as given. The motivation  for adjusting slowly is to smooth the path 
In practice, countries with inflation targets do not formally adjust for ex- 
change rates in the way suggested here. However, adjustments may occur im- 
plicitly. For example, a central bank economist once told me that inflation was 
below his country’s target but that this was desirable because the currency was 
temporarily strong and policy needed to “leave room” for the effects of depre- 
ciation. Keeping inflation below its official target when the exchange rate is 
strong is similar to targeting n*. 
3.6.2  Results 
of output. 
To examine T* targets formally, I substitute equations (12) and (1) into con- 
dition (14). This leads to the instrument rule implied by T*  targets: 
(15)  w’r + (1 - w’)e  =  a’y  +  b‘T*, 
where 
W’  = p/(p + S),  a’  = (1 -  + A)/@  + S),  b‘  = (1 -  q)/[o~(p  + S)]. 
This equation includes the same variables as the optimal rule in section 3.3, 
but the coefficients are different. The MCI weights are given exactly by the 
relative sizes of p and 6; for base parameters, w’  = 0.75. The coefficients on 
y and T*  depend on the adjustment speed q. 
The appendix calculates the variances of output and inflation under n*  tar- 
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Fig. 3.3  n*  Targeting 
strict IT* targeting corresponds to the northwest comer of the curve. For com- 
parison, figure 3.3 also plots the set of efficient policies from figure 3.1. 
The figure shows that targeting IT* produces more stable output than targeting 
T.  This is true even for strict IT*  targets, which produce an output variance of 
8.3, compared to 25.8 for IT  targets. Figure 3.4 shows the dynamic effects of an 
inflation shock under T*  targets and confirms that this policy avoids oscillations 
in output. Strict IT* targeting is, however, moderately inefficient. There is an 
efficient instrument rule that produces an output variance of  8.3 and an infla- 
tion variance of  1.2. Strict T*  targets produce the same output variance with 
an inflation variance of 1.9. 
As the parameter q is raised, so adjustment becomes slower, we move south- 
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Fig. 3.4  Strict mTT*  targets: responses to an inflation shock 
to the efficient frontier. Thus, as long as policymakers  put  a nonnegligible 
weight on output variance, there is a version of IT*  targeting that closely ap- 
proximates the optimal policy. For example, for equal weights on inflation and 
output variances, the optimal policy has an MCI weight w of 0.70 and output 
and T*  coefficients of  1.35 and 1.06. For a IT*  target with q = 0.66, the cor- 
responding numbers are 0.75, 1.43, and 1.08.  The variances of output and in- 142  Laurence Ball 
flation are 2.50 and 2.44 under the optimal policy and 2.48 and 2.48 under 
T*  targeting. 
3.7  Conclusion 
In a closed economy, inflation targeting and Taylor rules perform well in 
stabilizing both output and inflation. In an open economy, however, these poli- 
cies perform poorly unless they are modified. Specifically, if  policymakers 
minimize a weighted sum of output and inflation variances, their policy instru- 
ment should be an MCI based on both the interest rate and the exchange rate. 
The weight on the exchange rate is equal to or slightly greater than this vari- 
able’s relative effect on spending. As a target variable, policymakers with this 
paper’s objective function should choose “long-run inflation”-an  inflation 
variable purged of  the transitory effects of  exchange rate fluctuations. This 
variable should also replace inflation on the right-hand side of the instrument 
rule. 
Several countries currently use an MCI as their policy instrument. In addi- 
tion, some appear to have moved informally toward targeting long-run infla- 
tion, for example by keeping inflation below target when a depreciation is ex- 
pected. A possible strengthening of  this policy is to make long-run inflation 
the formal target variable. In practice, this could be done by adding an adjust- 
ment to calculations of “underlying” inflation: the effects of the exchange rate 
could be removed along with other transitory influences on inflation. At least 
one private firm in New Zealand already produces an underlying inflation se- 
ries along these lines (Dickens 1996). 
Appendix 
Domestic Goods and Imports 
Here I derive the Phillips curve, equation (2),  from assumptions about infla- 
tion in the prices of domestic goods and imports. Domestic goods inflation is 
given by 
This equation is similar to a closed economy Phillips curve: T”  is determined 
by lagged inflation and lagged output. 
To  determine import price inflation, I assume that foreign firms desire con- 
stant real prices in their home currencies. This implies that their desired real 
prices in local currency are -e. However, they adjust their prices to changes 
in e with a one-period lag. Like domestic firms, they also adjust their prices 
based on lagged inflation. Thus import inflation is 143  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
(A21  rm  ==  T,  - (e-, - c2). 
Finally, aggregate inflation is the average of (Al) and (A2) weighted by the 
shares of imports and domestic goods in the price index. If the import share is 
y, this yields equation (2)  with a = (1 -  y)a’ and q = (1 -  y)-qr. 
The Variances of Output and Inflation 
Here I describe  the computation  of the variances  of  output and inflation 
under alternative policies. Consider first the rule given by equations (6) and 
(7). Substituting equations (4) and (5) into equation (6) yields an expression 
for the exchange rate in terms of lagged e,  rr, and y 
(A3)  e  =  (Az +  an)y_,  +  nrr-, - (p/e +  S)ze-, +  yne-,  +  ZE 
+  nq +  pmv +  Pzv-,,  z  =  Am  +  an. 
This equation and equations (4) and (5) define a vector process for e, m, 
and y: 
(A4)  X  =  @,X-, +  Q7X-, +  E, 
where X  = [y  rr el’. 
The elements of E depend on the current and once-lagged values of  white 
noise shocks. Thus E follows a vector MA( 1) process with parameters deter- 
mined by the underlying parameters of  the model. X  follows an ARMA(2, 1) 
process. For given parameter values and given values of the constants m and 
n, one can numerically derive the variance of  X  using standard formulas (see 
Hendry  1995, sec.  11.3). To determine the set of efficient policies, I search 
over m and n to find combinations that minimize a weighted sum of the output 
and inflation variances. 
To determine the variances of  output and inflation under a rr*  target, note 
that equation (15) is equivalent to equation (7) with rn set to 0/(0S + p) and n 
set to 0( 1 -  q)/[a(OS  + p)]. For a given q,  the variances of output and inflation 
under equation (15) are given by the variances  for the equivalent version of 
equation (7). 
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Comment  Thomas J. Sargent 
Summary 
I offer two related, apparently but not necessarily contradictory, criticisms of 
Laurence Ball’s model. First, the model incorporates too little rational expecta- 
tions; second, it assumes too much rational expectations. The private sector 
uses too little rational expectations (at least compared to the government); and 
the government uses too much (in view of how little rational expectations Ball 
has built into the private sector’s model-and  in view of Ball’s empirical ap- 
proach to his model as an approximation). Let me explain from the beginning. 
Ball ascribes a return function to the government (a weighted sum of uncon- 
ditional variances of inflation and output) then solves a “modern” single-agent 
control problem to deduce an optimal rule for monetary policy. He models the 
economy as being like nature, a time-invariant system of stochastic difference 
Thomas J. Sargent is senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, the Donald Lucas Professor of 
Economics at Stanford University, and a research associate of  the National Bureau of Economic 
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equations, driven by serially uncorrelated shocks, presenting state and control 
vectors to the policymaker.  The policymaker views the model economy as 
“known”  and  “fixed”  (with  respect  to the policymaker’s choices). Though 
Ball’s model is estimable using modem methods (the “duals” of the control 
theoretic methods he uses), Ball abstains from estimation and instead resorts 
to “calibration.” In calibrating, Ball implicitly treats his model somehow as an 
approximation, not to be taken literally empirically. This empirical approach 
is compatible with Ball’s motivation of his work as a sensitivity exercise de- 
signed to explore how augmenting the government’s model to incorporate as- 
pects of a foreign sector will affect the character of optimal rules that he had 
deduced earlier from a related closed economy model (Ball 1997).  Ball does a 
good job of explaining the alterations he has made to the baseline closed econ- 
omy model, of  interpreting how they make the optimal rule change, and of 
informally explaining how the optimal rule corresponds to practices observed 
in some small open economies. The optimal rule contains the “advice” Ball 
coaxes from his formal model.’ 
Ball also evaluates six arbitrary rules. Within the confines of  this single pa- 
per, comparing the operation of these rules is of less interest than just looking 
at the optimal rule. These comparisons acquire interest as ingredients of a ro- 
bustness calculation only when they are put together with the workings of these 
six rules within the dzflerent models represented in the other papers in the con- 
ference. 
To  supplement Ball’s acknowledgment in  the  text  that  the  government’s 
model is “pre-Lucas  critique” (although cleverly constructed to embody one 
version of  the natural rate hypothesis), I recommend Robert King and Mark 
Watson’s (1994) “revisionist history” of the Phillips curve. King and Watson 
use theory and empirical evidence to document how the type of  “unit root” 
specification of the Phillips curve used by Ball reflects the serial correlation 
structure of inflation detected only over the last 25 years or so, which emerged 
hand in hand with our current fiat monetary policy regime. Our earlier mone- 
tary regime was associated with much lower serial correlation of inflation, and 
a different apparent intertemporal Phillips curve.3  I recommend Ball’s (1995) 
Journal of Monetary Economics paper (where the government sets a repeated 
economy strategy and the private economy makes predictions that reflect the 
government’s strategy) as an example of an analysis with optimizing behavior 
on all sides, a setup not subject to my first criticism (though possibly to my 
second one). 
1. Ball thus adheres to Einstein’s dictum that while nature might be complicated, it is not cruel. 
Contrast this modem view with the malevolent view of nature embraced by the “robust” monetary 
authority to be described shortly. 
2. He computes an optimal rule for each value of a relative weight parameterizing the govern- 
ment’s objective function. 
3. Robert Hall makes related and mare extensive observations in his comment on chap. 9 of 
this volume. 146  Laurence Ball 
Ball can argue somewhat convincingly that despite imperfect “microfound- 
ations,” and despite vulnerability to the Lucas critique, a model of his type can 
somehow be a good approximation to a “truer” (bigger? general equilibrium?) 
model. Accepting this defense against the charge of too little rational expecta- 
tions in the model strengthens my second criticism and prompts retreat from 
the rational expectations that Ball ascribes to the government in formulating 
its control problem. If the model is an approximation, the optimal policy rule 
ought to incorporate this attitude. This attitude recommends “postmodern” or 
“robust” rather than “modern” control theory. A quest for robustness overshad- 
ows this conference, so I want to explore how a preference for robustness 
would affect Ball’s analysis. 
Modern and Robust Government Problems 
Ball’s control problem is a member of the following class. Where x, and u, 
are the state and control vectors and z, is a vector representing the decision 
maker’s rewards, the government’s model is 
(14  x,,~ =  Ax, +  Bur +  Cw,,,, 
(1b)  U,  = -  Fx,, 
(1c)  z,  =  Hx,, 
where {w,+,}  is a martingale difference sequence with unity contemporaneous 
covariance matrix, adapted to its own hi~tory.~  The government chooses a feed- 
back rule of the form (lb) to achieve an objective that Ball formulates as the 
unconditional variance of z,. For the purpose of formalizing the control prob- 
lem, it is useful to express the model in the form 
(2)  Z,  =  G(L)w,  H[Z - (A - BF)L]-’Cw,, 
Equation (2)  shows how the white noise shocks w,  affect the variables the gov- 
ernment cares about. For Ball, the problem is to maximize minus the uncondi- 
tional variance of  z, by  choice of  I?  This can be expressed in the frequency 
domain as choosing an F to maximize 
4. For Ball’s model, we can take 147  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
(3)  H2 = -  Ez,z:  = -Ir [G(c)G([)’]  dc, 
where 5 is a complex variable, r is the unit circle, and the prime denotes matrix 
transposition and complex conjugation. 
This problem is “modern” in the sense that the government is assumed to 
know enough about the model to have rational expectations. It treats the model 
as known and true. This means that the government knows: (1) G(L)  and how 
it depends on F and (2)  that the shock process w,  is serially uncorrelated. 
Robust control theory would back away from the rational expectations as- 
sumption and endow the government with  the view  that  while “good,” its 
model is not “true,” only an approximation. Suspicion that the model is an 
approximation imparts a preference for “robustness,” that is, acceptable perfor- 
mance of  a rule across a range of  models  “in the vicinity” of  the govern- 
ment’s-‘‘in  the vicinity” because the model is viewed as a useful approxima- 
tion. To formalize this approach, robust decision theory treats the model not as 
true but as a base or reference model around which the government suspects 
approximation errom5  The key is to describe the form that the approximation 
errors can take, and how “big” they can be. Approximation errors have fruit- 
fully been formulated as showing up as a shock process {w,}  that is arbitrarily 
serially correlated, not serially uncorrelated as specified. If  the shocks have 
spectral density S,(<) rather than I, then the variance of z, is not given by  the 
second equality in equation (3)  but by 
(4)  H,  = -Ir G(c)S*.(c)G(c>’dc. 
The robust decision maker seeks a rule that delivers an “acceptable” H2  over a 
domain of somewhat arbitrary S,(<). To construct the domain of approximation 
errors, some sort of  “constant variance” restraint j,.S,(<)  dc =  Z is imposed on 
the potentially perturbed error processes. 
To design a robust rule, the decision maker performs a worst case analysis. 
He solves a problem of the form 
max mink,  such that  I,  S,([) dc  =  I. 
The F  that solves this max-min problem works better than the modern rule 
across much of the domain of unknown error serial correlation specifications. 
The associated minimizing S,(c)  is the “most pessimistic” view of  the shock 
serial correlation process, an artifact of computing a rule designed to work well 
over a variety of S,v([).6 
F  S,(l)  (5) 
S. For general background on robust control, see Zhou (1996), Bagar and Bernhard (1995), and 
Mustafa and Glover (1990). See Whittle (1990) for an account of risk-sensitive control, and Hansen 
and Sargent (1995) for a recursive reformulation of risk sensitivity designed to accommodate dis- 
counting. 
6. Max-min problems of this type occur widely in analyses of robustness. For a related problem 
in quite a different context, see Fudenberg and Levine (1995). 148  Laurence Ball 
Notice how this formulation makes the specification error show up as a per- 
turbed shock process that nevertheless feeds through the system in the way the 
model  specifies.  This  is a  restrictive  way  of  modeling  “misspecification,” 
though as Hatanaka’s (1975) work emphasized, arbitrarily serially correlated 
errors provide specifications so flexible that they often undermine econometric 
identifiability. A restrictive aspect of  the present way of modeling specification 
errors is that the misspecified errors are supposed to feed through the system 
just as those in the reference model. 
Remarkably, but maybe not surprisingly, because this is a form of Knightian 
uncertainty, there is a sense in which  the robust decision  maker turns back 
from the Lucas critique. Thus, for a given reference model, variations in the 
shock serial correlation process within the domain satisfying the constraint in 
problem (5)  are presumed to leave the robust decision rule intact. Here I am 
interpreting the Lucas critique as but an application of the principle, already 
well reflected in “Keynesian” contributions like Kareken, Muench, and Wal- 
lace (1973),’ stating that optimal decision rules depend on laws of motion or 
transition laws expressing the “constraints,” which in the modern setting al- 
ways include descriptions of the serial correlation patterns of the shocks. The 
robust controller’s behavior partly belies that principle.* 
Problem (5) embodies a game, not real, but a mental one, played in the mind 
of a monetary authority, who as an instrument for attaining a robust rule con- 
templates the reactions of a diabolical  nature that is not “fixed” and that in 
response to its choice of F, responds by “choosing” a shock process serial cor- 
relation structure to harm the monetary authority. The point is not that the poli- 
cymaker expects the worst but that by planning against it he assures acceptable 
performance under a range of specification errors. 
Problem (5) leads to what is called the H- formulation of robust decision 
theory.’ A less extreme and more convenient formulation is the “minimum en- 
tropy” criterion, according to which the government just maximizes 
This criterion is defined only for K  2 K,,,  where  K~  is the minimum positive 
scalar for which the integrand is positive semidefinite.l0 The decision rule F 
that maximizes criterion (6) approximates the decision rule F that solves prob- 
7. Their monetary authority has rational expectations  and recommends  “look at everything” 
rules, just like Ball’s. 
8. The robust decision maker’s behavior does vary  systematically with respect to variations in 
his reference model, the version of the Lucas critique that survives under robust decision theory. 
9. See Mustafa and Glover (1990); see Hansen and Sargent (1998) for the formulations of H- 
control modified to incorporate discounting. Hansen and Sargent also describe the “minimum en- 
tropy” formulation below and how it relates to the H- criterion. In an interesting example, Kasa 
(1998) studies how a robust controller would behave in ways that an outsider might interpret as 
responding to adjustment costs. 
10. Hansen and Sargent (1998) derive this criterion for discounted problems relate it to the H- 
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Table 3C.1  Robust Policy Rules 
U  LI  b 
0  1.04  .82 
-.I  1.17  1.13 
-  .2  1.55  2.08 
lem (5) as K \  K~.  Further, the parameter  K > 0 is interpretable in terms of the 
risk-sensitive formulation of Whittle (1990) and Hansen and Sargent (1995). 
In particular,  K  equals minus the reciprocal  of the risk-sensitivity  parameter, 
u.“  Formulation (6) provides a “smooth” one-parameter family of approxima- 
tors of  (5).  For (T  = 0, we have the modem case, while for u  approaching 
-K;’,  we attain the case envisaged in (5). 
Examples 
Using criterion (6), I have computed decision rules for three values of -  K- 
= (IT,  namely, u = 0, -.1,  and  -.2. I prefer to parameterize  in terms of  u 
because of its link to risk sensitivity, but this is just a matter of taste. The value 
u = 0 corresponds to Ball’s calculations and checks my calculations against 
his.12 For Ball’s parameter  values and the case of equal weights on inflation 
and output variances in the government’s objective, I calculated the responses 
of the interest rate, r to output y and the monetary conditions index T* given 
in table 3C.1. Here r = iiy + b~*,  where ii and 5 are calculated just as in the 
(IT  = 0 case as explained by Ball. These numbers agree with Ball’s in the u = 
0 case. Note how the interest rate becomes more sensitive to both y and 7~*  as 
the absolute value of u  rises (i.e., as the preference for robustness increases). 
This aspect of the rules illustrates that the “caution” induced by activating the 
preference for robustness does not translate into “doing less.” Caution is rela- 
tive to a worst case pattern of the shock process, which depends on the specifi- 
cation of the reference model. In particular, the specification of the model af- 
fects  the magnitude and the serial correlation  properties  of  the  worst  case 
shocks, and thus influences how the policymaker responds to actual shocks.” 
To shed light on how  a preference for robustness  surfaces, it is useful to 
display the optimized G(5) functions in the frequency  domain. Figure 3C. 1 
displays the maximum singular value of G(iJG(5)’ by frequency for u = 0, 
-  .I, and -  .2. As u  rises in absolute value, the maximum singular value across 
I I. See Anderson, Hansen, and Sargent (1997) and Hansen and Sargent (1998). These papers 
also relate the risk-sensitive formulation to measures of  model misspecification like those used by 
White (1982) and Sims (1972). 
12. They agree where they should. 
13. That robust control can be “more active” comes through in results reported by Zhou (1996, 
While the optimal rules remain linear, their dependence on innovation variances reflects a break- 
438-39). 
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Fig. 3C.1  Logarithm of maximum singular values of G(5)  for three values of u 
Note: u = 0, -.1,  and  -.2  are indicated by  solid, dashed, and dash-dotted lines, respectively. 
Angular frequency (from 0 to a)  is the ordinate, the logarithm of the maximum singular value 
the coordinate. 
0  0.5  1  1.5  2  2.5  3  3.5 
frequencies falls, but the area under the curve rises.I4  This pattern captures how 
worst case performance improves as u  rises in absolute value, at the cost of 
worse performance at the reference model. In particular, think about how the 
“great deceiver” feared in problem (5) would respond to a G(5) having the 
pattern of maximum singular values associated with the u = 0 case in figure 
3C. 1. The deceiver could lower the utility of the monetary authority (raise the 
weighted  average of  variances) by  concentrating the spectral power of  the 
shock process near the frequencies at which the maximum singular value is 
highest. To protect itself against such a malevolent nature, the monetary au- 
thority can design a rule to lower the maximum singular value, although this 
causes the average level of the maximum singular values across frequencies to 
drift upward (which lowers the value of the monetary authority’s objective un- 
der the assumption that the reference model is true).  In Ball’s model, flattening 
the maximum singular values across frequencies can be achieved by  making 
the interest rate respond more to both y and T*. 
14. The L- norms for u  = 0, -.1,  and -.2  are 3.13,2.68, and 2.22; the Lz norms are 1.57, 1.61, 
and 1.97. 151  Policy Rules for Open Economies 
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Fig. 3C.2  Impulse response of [y  n  e-,I‘ to [E, q,  (l/d2)vt]’  for Ball’s model for 
three values of u 
Nore: u  = 0, -.1,  and -.2  are indicated by solid, dashed, and dotted lines. The shocks correspond 
to columns. the variables to rows. 
Figure 3C.2 depicts the impulse response functions with respect to the w,s 
(i.e., the G(L)s)  for the three values of u = 0, -. 1, and -.2. Close inspection of 
these figures confirms how making u  more negative leads to “whiter” impulse 
responses. The “less colorful” impulse responses reflect the “flattening” across 
frequencies of  the maximum singular values as u (which is nonpositive) is 
raised in absolute value. Thus the “more active” responses in the rules for more 
negative us, depicted in table 3C.  1, deliver whiter spectral outcomes (assuming 
the reference model to be true). 
Thus this particular way of framing the class of misspecifications to be pro- 
tected against causes “more caution” to translate into “more activity.” How can 
this happen? One way  to approach this question is to study how the “worst 
case” conditional means of  the shocks, call them Gr+J,  respond to the true 
shocks w,.  Hansen, Sargent, and Tallarini (forthcoming) report a formula for 
such worse case conditional means. The formula shows how the worst case 
conditional means are linear functions of the state of the system x,. This makes 
it possible to compute impulse responses of the worst case shocks with respect 
to the w,s. Figure 3C.3 depicts the impulse responses of these worst case condi- 
tional means in the shocks with respect to the w,s  for u = -. 1 and -  .2; for 152  Laurence Ball 
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Fig. 3C.3  Impulse response of the worst case [E, qf  (1/42)v,l’ with respect to 
[E, qr  (1/42)v,]’ for Ball’s model for two values of u 
Note:  cr = -  .  1 and -  .2 are indicated by  dashed and dotted lines. The shocks correspond to col- 
umns, the worst case shocks to rows. 
IJ = 0, these worst case means are identically zero. The impulse responses in 
figure 3C.3 show how for Ball’s model, the worst case conditional means in 
the shocks change both in size and in their serial correlation properties as  IJ 
becomes more negative. Figure 3C.3 shows how the worst case conditional 
means of  shocks become larger as u  grows in absolute value, and that they 
respond as though the worst case shocks are serially correlated.lS  This makes 
the robust decision maker respond to what the reference model asserts are 
white noise shocks as though they were positively serially correlated. To guard 
against the worst case, the robust decision maker exercises caution by “press- 
ing the brakes” or “pushing on the accelerator” more than would the modern 
decision maker. This is reasonable because a shock is interpreted as being 
larger and more persistent than it is supposed to be by  the reference model. 
This helps to explain the pattern of  the table 3C.  1 responses. 
15. The figures also show that the worst case shocks are less serially correlated for the u  that is 
larger in absolute value. In interpreting this diminished serial correlation, it has to be remembered 
that these objects are the outcome of the “game” associated with a minimax problem, and that the 
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Thus, in the context of Ball’s model, the caution exercised by  the robust 
decision maker does not manifest itself in the form of moving less in response 
to shocks. Robust decision theory teaches that what caution means depends on 
the model with respect to which caution is being exercised. 
Unanswered Questions 
The preceding  response  to my  two criticisms  of  Ball’s general  approach 
opens more questions than it answers. If we imagine the monetary authority to 
be using robust decision theory as I have outlined, what should be done to close 
the model, in the spirit of seeking some counterpart to a rational expectations 
equilibrium, only now where both the government and the market are robust 
decision makers? More generally, if policymakers  are entertaining the same 
doubts across models as we are at this conference, how are we to formulate the 
forecasting problems facing private agents? Along with the papers presented 
in this  conference,  my “robust decision”  analysis of  Ball’s model proceeds 
without any sort of “robust equilibrium” concept.16  Maybe such an equilibrium 
concept could help us.” 
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Discussion Summary 
Regarding Sargent’s discussion of the paper, Bob Hall conjectured that since a 
Bayesian does not respect the Knightian distinction between risk and uncer- 
tainty, all knowledge could be properly summarized in a Bayesian framework. 
Sargent  replied that  with  an infinite-dimensional parameter space as given 
here, the Bayes consistency theorem breaks down. As an early reference on 
this issue, Sargent cited Christopher Sims’s thesis. 
David Longworth noted that the model’s policy recommendation was very 
similar to what the Bank of Canada has been doing in the past, for example, 
deriving the MCI weights from the IS curve and carefully considering the ex- 
change rate effect on inflation. A simple extension of the model would be to 
allow for cross-correlation between the error in the IS curve and the error in 
the exchange rate equation. The reason this is interesting is that this correla- 
tion, that is, the degree to which exchange rates are driven by  nonfinancial 
fundamentals, determines the desirability of the MCI as a target variable in the 
short run. For example, the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Bank of England 
both tend to think that there is a high correlation between these error terms for 
their respective home countries. Under those circumstances, it is not desirable 
to leave the MCI unchanged over one period. On the contrary, the Bank of 
Canada believes this correlation to be very small in Canada (especially when 
one abstracts from shocks to commodity prices and from readily observable 
shocks to the IS curve). 
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exchange rates have been very important through import prices in the recent 
U.S. inflation experience. Second, globalization leads to increased openness 
that affects the way  monetary policy should respond. Meyer then expressed 
reluctance to use the MCI as a policy instrument. He argued that the optimal 
response of interest rates to changes in the exchange rate depends on the source 
and the persistence of the change. Also, the MCI is an incomplete measure of 
overall financial conditions. It leaves out such variables as long interest rates 
and equity prices, which might be equally or more important. Meyer proposed 
interpreting the paper as having an interest rate instrument that reacts to the 
exchange rate. 
Frederic Mishkin mentioned the New Zealand experience, where exchange 
rate effects are much faster than interest rate effects. That creates an instrument 
instability and controllability problem as described in the paper, in particular 
with rigid bands and a short horizon. 
Andrew Levin noted that the appendix of his paper with Wieland and Wil- 
liams presented at the conference summarized some analysis of the importance 
of openness for U.S. policy rules. Stochastic simulations of  the Taylor multi- 
country model and deterministic simulations of  the Federal Reserve Board 
global model show that the optimal policy rules are essentially identical for 
different assumptions on foreign policy. This can be interpreted as evidence 
for the size of  the external sector in the U.S. economy being small and the 
passthrough of exchange rates into prices being slow. In the context of  Ball’s 
model, this means that the 6 and y coefficients seem to be very small for the 
United States. Ball responded that the applicability of the model to the case of 
the United States is still an open question. He also expressed surprise over 
the ongoing discussion about the importance of recent events in Asia for the 
United States. 
Lars Svensson noted that the Bank of  Sweden is not using the MCI but a 
repurchase rate as a policy instrument. The MCI is used as a measure of  the 
impact of monetary policy on aggregate demand. 
Svensson also remarked that the exchange rate equation, equation (3) in the 
paper, is not consistent with the exchange rate being an asset price, that is, with 
interest rate parity. Furthermore, Svensson had recently addressed this problem 
in a forward-looking framework where he obtained an MCI that depended on 
the real exchange rate and a long real interest rate, as opposed to the short rate. 
Thus the resulting MCI in such a framework is very different from the measure 
being used by  actual central banks. Richard  Clarida suggested interpreting 
eqi;ation (3)  as a link between the log real exchange rate and  an interest differ- 
ential. Such an equation can be derived from underlying principles as in Camp- 
bell and Clarida (l987), but a necessary condition for that proportionality to 
hold is that the real interest rate follow an AR( 1) process. Without this assump- 
tion, the entire term structure of  interest rates enters the equation. Moreover, 
when the policymaker chooses the exchange rate e,  he only chooses the current 
interest rate r in the paper. In a more general model, this amounts to choosing 156  Laurence Ball 
the entire time path of  r, so that the resulting MCI would not have as nice a 
representation in terms of current variables as in the paper. 
Ben McCallurn wondered about the paper’s use of real variables to measure 
the MCI. First, the MCI used by  actual central banks like New Zealand and 
Canada is measured in terms of nominal variables. How should such an MCI 
measure be deflated? This is not clear since subtracting the expected inflation 
rate would be appropriate to calculate real interest rates and dividing by  the 
price level would be appropriate to obtain the real exchange rate. Second, pol- 
icy indicators should ideally be nominal variables instead of real ones. 
John Taylor noted that small economies have a desire to prevent exchange 
rate  fluctuations and  many  papers  at  the  conference discuss  interest  rate 
smoothing. What about exchange rate  smoothing? Lars  Svensson answered 
that with a short horizon for inflation targeting, there is a tendency to move the 
exchange rate too much. With a longer horizon, the exchange rate is smoothed 
to stabilize the consumer price index. David Langworth added that it would be 
important to include tables in the paper showing the variance of  interest and 
exchange rates across different policy rules. This is particularly important for 
the comparison of  rules targeting T (actual inflation) and T*  (long-run in- 
flation). 
Nicolettu Butini remarked that it would be interesting to see how rules with 
different target specifications, for example domestic inflation, compare to the 
“long-run’’ inflation target in the paper. Use of targets that-in  an economy 
that  imports only final goods-are  not influenced by  the exchange-rate-to- 
import-price channel may remove the need for an ad hoc target a la Ball. Also, 
the use of an MCI as an instrument is not desirable because it requires measur- 
ing the equilibrium exchange rate in addition to the equilibrium interest rate 
and the output gap as in more conventional, Taylor-type simple rules. 
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